By Henry Mayega

The National Resistance Movement (NRM), last week, held meetings of the Central Executive Committee (CEC), National Executive Committee (NEC) and National Conference (NC) from January 23-25, 2020. All those meetings resonate with the provisions of the Political Parties and Organisations Act (PPOA), the law that regulates the functioning of political parties in Uganda.

Essentially that law, which hitherto did not exist and that circumstance left a void, part of the reason why pluralism in Uganda was riddled with a lot of indiscipline on the part of political actors, is meant to stem errant behaviour. For instance, between 1979 – 1980, Ugandans, in a debilitating and chaotic political environment saw a change of heads of state five times: Idi Amin, Yusufu Lule, Godfrey Binaisa, Paul Muwanga and Milton Obote; and the price paid in terms of loss of human life, economic stagnation as well as wanton destruction of property was unacceptable!

First, the Yoweri Museveni administration should be credited for having had that foresight of enacting such a Law. It should be noted that since the inception of that Law, political actors have, save for those without a knack for order, largely been careful not to cross the red lines and rules of engagement. As a mass party, the NRM through its Committees like CEC, NEC and NC has ensured internal party cohesion with far-reaching positive reverberations for the country, including political stability. As the governing party, NRM’s stability is, arguably, critical for national progress and multiparty democracy.

Secondly, the NEC, CEC and NC meetings were a plus to the growth of both NRM’s internal democracy and cohesion as well as our country’s pluralistic practices. Again, as a mass party, which is explained by the magnitude and amplitude of its NC of over 14,000 members, it sets a good example to the other smaller parties namely UPC, FDC, DP JEEMA and CP in terms of party discipline, structural strength and accountability. If the NRM became rowdy, that would spell doom to the entities above and the domino effects to them would include indiscipline and instability hence reversing our democratic gains since 1986. Ugandans should remember that Yoweri Museveni, using his safe pair of hands and supported by his gallant NRA comrades, paid the ultimate price to bring about those gains.

Thirdly, those meetings were, particularly crucial because they permitted the NRM under President Yoweri Museveni to audit the running manifesto and forward-plan the 2021-2026 manifesto which will be sold to the Ugandan voter in the 2021 campaigns and general elections. They, simultaneously, permitted the Yoweri Museveni administration to gauge the pace and pulse of the progressive interventions meant to spur national development and growth of democracy. That audit, ideally, looked at the levels of manifesto implementation, successes and gaps and was expected to be the administration’s accountability to the Ugandan voter for the last four or so years since the last general elections in 2016; in case some less sagacious opposition stalwarts have forgotten,  the Yoweri Museveni administration and its manifesto were endorsed in those elections to steer the country up to 2021, forget about Kiiza Besigye’s and Bobi Wine’s infamous “People’s Government” and “People Power” political gymnastics, respectively.

Lastly, those meetings dealt, decisively, with the lingering internal contradictions like the issues of party primary elections’ cost, “rebel MPs” and “Independents” through candid dialogue and firmness.

The Writer is Deputy Head of Mission, Uganda Embassy, Beijing China.

Stories Continues after ad

By Tobias Adrian and Fabio Natalucci

While we have seen some recent volatility, many risky asset markets around the world had a spectacular year in 2019. Equity market indices were up just over 30 percent in the United States, close to 25 percent in Europe and China, and over 15 percent in emerging markets and Japan. Emerging-market sovereign debt, U.S. high-yield debt, and emerging-market corporate debt all had returns in excess of 12 percent. Remarkably, the fourth quarter of 2019 was especially strong in China and in emerging markets.

What explains the strong performance of risky assets? One important driving force boosting asset prices was the synchronized monetary policy easing throughout 2019. As concerns about the global economy grew, central banks around the world—including the U.S. Federal Reserve and the European Central Bank—eased monetary policy through rate cuts and unconventional tools. The combined number of policy rate cuts in advanced and emerging- market economies was the largest since the global financial crisis in 2008.

The forceful response of many central banks contributed to an easing of financial conditions around the globe, which in turn helped contain downside risks to the global economic outlook.

The improvement in market sentiment is reflected in one of the most commonly cited indicators of downside risks, the 10-year–2-year yield curve slope, which measures the difference between yields on 2- and 10-year government debt. The slope had flattened significantly since early 2018, suggesting increasing investor concern about the economic outlook. However, the slope started to steepen again in the fourth quarter of 2019 in the United States, United Kingdom, and Germany, suggesting that investors had regained some optimism about the outlook.

The most recent WEO update discusses the easing of financial conditions and the reassessment of downside risks, and cautiously forecasts a slight rebound of global economic activity this year and next, albeit to a lower level than previously forecast. In our view, 2019 demonstrated the continuous effectiveness of monetary policy, especially when easing is undertaken in a synchronized manner around the globe. The IMF estimates that global growth would have been 0.5 percentage point lower without global monetary policy stimulus. That is a powerful outcome in the face of heightened downside risks.

Taking a longer-term view, however, the easing of global financial conditions so late in the economic cycle and the continued buildup of financial vulnerabilities—including the rise in asset valuations to stretched levels in some markets and countries, the rise in debt, and large capital flows to emerging markets—could threaten growth in the medium term. For example, default rates have increased in the U.S. high-yield market, as well as in Chinese on- and offshore corporate bond markets, albeit from low levels. Furthermore, while emerging-market spreads—the difference in yields between emerging-market debt and a benchmark such as U.S. Treasuries—are very tight for most countries, there are some specific cases where emerging-market debt is trading at distress levels, admittedly with no signs of spillovers so far.

It is therefore crucial that policy makers continue to monitor the buildup of financial vulnerabilities and take steps to address them where appropriate in order to reduce the chance that such vulnerabilities may amplify the adverse impact of shocks to the global economy. While the easing of monetary policy last year played an important role in containing downside risks to the global economy, the deployment of cyclical macroprudential policy tools, such as the countercyclical capital buffer, is now paramount to keep rising vulnerabilities from putting growth at risk in the medium term.

Stories Continues after ad