By Christopher Burke
With Donald Trump’s re-election on November 6, 2024 coupled with a strengthened Republican majority in the Senate and additional seats in the House of Representatives there is renewed curiosity and speculation over how U.S. foreign policy, particularly towards Africa, might shift. Trump’s previous administration, characterized by an “America First” doctrine placed emphasis on a transactional approach to international engagement seeking to maximize short-term U.S. interests over longer-term strategic alliances and aid commitments. With a reinforced mandate, Trump’s Africa policy can be expected to mirror or intensify these themes with significant implications across trade, foreign aid, security and diplomatic relations.
A key uncertainty under Trump’s renewed leadership is the fate of the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) that provides eligible African nations with duty-free access to the U.S. market. AGOA is set to expire in 2025. While the Biden administration had laid groundwork for its renewal, a Trump administration may view it less favorably. Previous trade tensions and tariffs imposed by Trump’s administration on trading partners suggest a possible renegotiation or even a reduction of AGOA benefits aligned with his stance on “reciprocal trade.” African economies heavily reliant on AGOA such as Kenya, Ethiopia and South Africa could see a loss of export revenue and hindered economic growth pressing African countries to seek alternative trade partnerships.
A second Trump term could provide an opportunity for targeted trade policies that focus on mutually beneficial investments. Trump’s administration may support trade agreements that boost specific U.S. industries, especially natural resource sectors where Africa has vast potential. Trump’s administration could explore “energy partnerships” where American companies secure oil, gas and mineral rights to aid U.S. industry and provide African governments with lucrative contracts. This approach would emphasize short-term profits for U.S. companies and possibly downplay broader considerations such as fair labour practices, environmental sustainability and community development.
Under Trump’s initial tenure, foreign aid experienced proposed cuts and the narrative around U.S. assistance shifted toward prioritizing American interests. A second term could cement this transactional nature potentially reducing aid for African initiatives in health, education and infrastructure. Programs championed by past administrations such as the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) and the Feed the Future initiative might see reduced funding, impacting Africa’s capacity to address health crises and food security.
Trump’s administration may promote more privatized aid, favoring projects where American companies lead development efforts and create business opportunities for U.S. firms under the guise of aid. This shift may reduce the volume of grant-based assistance replaced with financing structures that prioritize profit-making enterprises. This could possibly result in more sustainable and business-oriented aid that enable African economies to develop autonomous funding mechanisms for essential services.
Security cooperation between the U.S. and African nations has been a longstanding pillar of U.S.-Africa relations especially in regions grappling with violent extremism. During Trump’s first term, U.S. troop levels in Africa decreased most notably in areas combating groups such as Boko Haram, Al-Shabaab and ISIS affiliates. The approach prioritized cost-saving measures aligned with Trump’s skepticism of prolonged overseas military engagements.
With a reinforced political mandate, Trump’s second term could see further reductions in U.S. military presence that shifts more responsibility to African-led missions. Alternatively, the U.S. may increase reliance on airstrikes and intelligence sharing bolstered by drone technology and partnerships with local African forces. This approach minimizes American troop exposure, but possibly compromise the effectiveness of on-the-ground operations against well-entrenched militant groups. A reduced military engagement could create a security vacuum providing openings for other powers such as Russia and China to further expand their influence through security deals and military support to African nations.
The Trump administration’s diplomatic stance on Africa was, at times, marred by derogatory comments that strained relations with African leaders. In a second term, Trump’s administration might seek to repair some of this damage to prevent losing further ground to China that has made significant inroads in Africa through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). China’s investment in African infrastructure, resource extraction and technology sectors has positioned it as a vital source of support, offering African nations an alternative to continued dependence on traditional partners.
To counterbalance China’s growing influence, Trump may adopt a “strategic diplomacy” model to selective engage African nations based on their strategic relevance to U.S. interests. In this framework, resource-rich countries or those with military bases would receive greater diplomatic attention, while other nations might experience less frequent engagement. Such an approach, risks alienating nations that are less strategically relevant, but still important to U.S.-Africa relationships. A reduced focus on soft power diplomacy could also weaken the U.S. position as a stable, values-based partner and cede even more influence to China’s model of development without democratic strings attached.
Trump’s approach to Africa has often sidelined discussions on human rights, democracy and governance in favor of economic and security concerns. While past U.S. administrations emphasized democratic values and governance reforms, Trump’s tenure could deprioritize these issues creating mixed signals for African leaders on governance. A reduced emphasis on human rights may lead to increased freedom for some authoritarian regimes to suppress dissent potentially undermining Africa’s progress in democratic reforms.
Trump’s preference for bilateral relations could provide African leaders with greater flexibility to negotiate terms tailored to their own development priorities and avoid the constraints of broader, multilateral policy frameworks that emphasize governance standards. A stronger emphasis on one-on-one agreements may also enable African leaders to assert their agendas more directly in negotiations and overlook or deprioritize democratic standards in favor of expedient agreements.
Donald Trump’s re-election marks a critical juncture for U.S.-Africa relations. With a reinforced mandate, Trump’s policies towards Africa are likely to prioritize economic and security interests with less emphasis on traditional aid and democratic values. While this approach may provide African nations with short-term economic opportunities, it raises questions associated with the long-term implications for Africa’s sovereignty, security and democratic governance.
The focus on short-term, transactional engagements combined with a reduced U.S. military presence and potentially reduced aid could shift Africa’s reliance towards other global powers such as China and Russia. In this evolving landscape, African nations need to navigate a complex array of international partnerships to protect their own interests. Trump’s second term will likely demand greater self-reliance and strategic diplomacy from African leaders as they negotiate their place within a shifting global order.
Christopher Burke is a senior advisor at WMC Africa, a communications and advisory agency located in Kampala, Uganda. With nearly 30 years of experience, Christopher has worked extensively on social, political and economic development issues focused on governance, communications, international relations and peace-building in Asia and Africa.
