Simbamanyo house which was acquired by tycoon Sudhir Ruparelia.
The Commercial Division of the High Court has dismissed a high-profile legal challenge filed by Simbamanyo Estates Limited, ruling that the $10 million post-import loan facility extended to Equity Bank was lawful, enforceable and executed without fraud or undue influence.
The ruling, delivered on July 25, 2025, by Justice Harriet Grace Magala, brings an end to a years-long legal battle that centered on Simbamanyo’s mortgaged properties—Simbamanyo House and Afrique Suites Hotel—which were sold off in 2020 after the company defaulted on loan repayments. In her 67-page judgment, Justice Magala firmly concluded that the transactions were legally structured and did not violate the Financial Institutions Act or any banking regulations in Uganda.
“The court finds that the 1st and 2nd defendants did not conduct financial institution business in Uganda unlawfully. The syndicated loan arrangement was a permissible and commercial necessity,” Justice Magala ruled.
The dispute dates back to 2012 when Simbamanyo secured a $6 million syndicated loan from Equity Bank Uganda and Equity Bank Kenya. In 2017, the company obtained a $10 million bridge loan from Mauritius-based Bank One, backed by a standby letter of credit issued by Equity Bank Kenya. When Simbamanyo defaulted on its obligations, Equity Bank Kenya triggered the standby letter and made the payment to Bank One, effectively activating the post-import loan with Equity Bank Uganda.
Simbamanyo challenged the arrangement, arguing that Equity Bank Uganda was not the designated lender under the facility and that no formal utilization request had been submitted to authorize the disbursement. The court dismissed this line of argument, stating that the terms of the agreement made the utilization request optional.
“The utilization request under clause 5.1(a) was optional, not mandatory. The facility was self-executing upon default and encashment of the standby letter of credit,” the judge ruled.
Simbamanyo also claimed the loan violated the Financial Institutions Act, alleging that Equity Bank Kenya and Bank One were conducting banking business in Uganda without licenses. Justice Magala disagreed and explained that the Act only prohibits deposit-taking by unauthorized entities within Uganda, not borrowing from foreign banks.
“The Financial Institutions Act was never intended to forbid borrowing from foreign entities. Had Parliament intended such a restriction, it would have said so explicitly,” she stated.
The court further defended the syndicated nature of the loan, explaining that it was structured to prevent Equity Bank Uganda from exceeding regulatory lending limits. “The plaintiff and the 2nd defendant entered into a syndicated loan facility, which was necessary because the 1st defendant would otherwise exceed its credit and exposure limit,” Justice Magala said.
Regarding whether Simbamanyo was properly notified before the standby letter was triggered, the court emphasized that the legal obligations were clearly stated in the agreement and did not require the borrower’s consent or awareness at the time of execution.
“A standby letter is a separate security agreement. Once triggered, the issuing bank is obligated to pay regardless of the borrower’s awareness,” the ruling stated.
Simbamanyo had also alleged fraud, undue influence, and breach of fiduciary duty in the execution and enforcement of the loan facilities. However, the court found no evidence to support these claims.
“There was no fraudulent misrepresentation, undue influence, or breach of fiduciary duty proved against the defendants,” Justice Magala ruled.
The judge further noted that the absence of a formal written demand before enforcing the loan did not prejudice Simbamanyo, since the company was fully aware of the timelines, terms, and its own obligations.
“The absence of a written demand did not prejudice the plaintiff, who was aware of the facility timelines and obligations,” she added.
The ruling effectively upholds the sale of Simbamanyo House and Afrique Suites Hotel, which were auctioned after the company failed to meet its debt obligations. Simbamanyo House was acquired by Meera Investments, a company owned by Tycoon Sudhir Ruparelia, while Luwaluwa Investments purchased Afrique Suites. The sales sparked widespread public and legal debate and were followed by a string of court applications filed by Simbamanyo in efforts to reverse the transactions.
Those efforts have now been exhausted, as the Commercial Court found in favor of Equity Bank Uganda, Equity Bank Kenya, and Bank One Limited on all substantive issues. The decision not only validates the banks’ enforcement actions but also signals judicial support for cross-border syndicated lending structures within Uganda’s legal framework.
With this ruling, legal analysts say the matter is now conclusively settled, barring any potential appeal—although many believe the prospects of a successful challenge are now exceedingly slim.
Justice Magala’s decision marks the final chapter in a legal battle that spanned over a decade and involved multiple court appearances, appeals, and even political interventions. It offers both clarity and precedent for how Ugandan courts will handle similar disputes involving foreign-backed commercial loans and the enforcement of credit instruments such as standby letters.
For Equity Bank, the ruling is a significant vindication of its position and conduct. For Simbamanyo, it marks the final legal defeat in a long campaign to regain the properties that once symbolized its real estate empire.
Ms Justine Bagyenda, the former Executive Director in charge of Supervision at the Bank of Uganda. She was key in gifting Crane Bank to DFCU without going through the due process, as was revealed to Parliament.
Justice Paul Stanley, delivering judgment in case [2025] EWHC 1915 (Comm), emphasized that DFCU’s reliance on the PwC report was misguided and legally impermissible without proper cross-examination.
The legal battle between Crane Bank Limited and DFCU Bank has taken a dramatic and decisive turn in London, where the High Court of England and Wales has struck a major blow to DFCU’s legal strategy in a ruling that could redefine the 2017 bank takeover saga.
Notably, the court refused to admit key evidence presented by DFCU Bank, specifically a forensic audit conducted by PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC), as it was deemed unreliable, unverified, and unfit to be treated as factual evidence in a fair trial.
Justice Paul Stanley, delivering judgment in case [2025] EWHC 1915 (Comm), emphasized that DFCU’s reliance on the PwC report was misguided and legally impermissible without proper cross-examination.
He noted, “The findings in the report, if accurate, point to management practices inconsistent with what any sensible regulator would wish to see operating a strategically important bank,” but made clear that such findings cannot be accepted at face value. He ruled that the conclusions of PwC—commissioned by the Bank of Uganda following its dramatic seizure of Crane Bank—were not independently verifiable and carried the risk of prejudicing the proceedings.
This ruling has shaken the foundation of DFCU’s long-held defense. Since the 2017 transaction, in which DFCU acquired Crane Bank’s assets at a price described by critics as a “giveaway price,” the bank has consistently cited the PwC audit to justify the takeover. That narrative has now suffered a fatal wound. For Crane Bank and its former majority shareholder, businessman Sudhir Ruparelia, the court’s position represents vindication after nearly a decade of fighting what they describe as a politically motivated and economically reckless expropriation.
Crane Bank was once the crown jewel of Uganda’s indigenous banking sector—well-capitalized, expansive, and widely trusted by local customers. Its abrupt closure under the watch of the Bank of Uganda sent tremors throughout the financial system and led to accusations of regulatory overreach, conflicts of interest, and state-sponsored favoritism. The sale to DFCU, reportedly for Shs200 billion, was completed without shareholder consultation or open competitive bidding, sparking claims of a pre-arranged backdoor deal.
Over the years, Sudhir and his legal team have argued that the entire transaction was engineered under pretenses and enabled by a flawed regulatory process. The PwC audit, it turns out, was central to this narrative, yet it has now been rendered legally irrelevant in one of the world’s most credible courtrooms. Compounding this revelation, it was also established that PwC Uganda, the entity behind the audit, was not even an internationally accredited member of PwC Global at the time and had deep entanglements with key actors in the case.
The UK court ruling also hints at the broader institutional failure that enabled the takeover. It opens the door for Crane Bank to pursue not just legal restitution, but reputational repair and possibly financial compensation. Legal analysts point out that the invalidation of the audit as factual evidence undermines the very basis upon which the Bank of Uganda justified the handover. The judgment has therefore shifted momentum squarely in favor of Crane Bank, dismantling DFCU’s shield and exposing it to intensified scrutiny.
Although the court did approve DFCU’s request to access Sudhir Ruparelia’s mobile phone and his daughter Sheena Ruparelia’s private email account for purposes of discovery, this gain is seen as marginal compared to the strategic blow suffered by the disqualification of the PwC report. The ruling draws a clear line between fair judicial standards and unchecked regulatory power, setting a powerful precedent for similar cases involving disputed corporate takeovers in politically volatile environments.
For DFCU Bank, what once appeared to be a calculated expansion now looks more like an acquisition mired in scandal. The loss of a cornerstone piece of evidence will likely force the bank to re-evaluate its entire litigation posture ahead of the 12-week trial set to begin in October 2026. In the meantime, public confidence in both DFCU and the regulatory bodies involved continues to erode, with observers calling for a full accounting of how a once-thriving bank was dismantled and handed over under questionable circumstances.
The judgment has also reignited conversations around Uganda’s financial governance, especially the reliance on foreign consultants to legitimize domestic actions. It underscores the importance of due process, transparency, and the dangers of regulatory capture. The fact that a UK court is now taking the lead in disentangling what many saw as a locally contained financial scandal speaks volumes about the trust deficit within Ugandan institutions.
As the case proceeds toward full trial, what’s at stake is no longer just the fate of Crane Bank or DFCU’s liability—it is the credibility of Uganda’s banking oversight, the role of foreign forensic consultants in regulatory decision-making, and the limits of executive influence in financial markets. What began as a domestic banking dispute has now escalated into an international test of justice, corporate accountability, and economic sovereignty.
The 2017 acquisition may yet prove to be one of the most legally and ethically contested financial transactions in East African history. And with DFCU Bank’s most powerful piece of evidence now dismantled, the tables may have finally turned in favor of Crane Bank and Sudhir Ruparelia.
Genesis of the saga
The saga between Crane Bank and DFCU Bank dates back to October 2016, when the Bank of Uganda announced it had taken over Crane Bank Limited, citing undercapitalization and failure to meet statutory requirements. Crane Bank, then one of Uganda’s largest and most successful indigenous banks, was placed under statutory management, triggering alarm across the financial sector and laying the groundwork for a series of highly controversial events.
Founded in 1995 by businessman Sudhir Ruparelia, Crane Bank had risen through the ranks to become a key player in Uganda’s banking industry. It boasted over 45 branches across the country, a strong customer base, a robust balance sheet, and consistently profitable performance. By 2015, the bank’s total assets had reached Shs1.8 trillion, and it was widely seen as a symbol of local entrepreneurial success. Its audited accounts had regularly received clean reports, most notably from KPMG, one of the global Big Four audit firms.
But on October 20, 2016, the Bank of Uganda issued a stunning announcement: Crane Bank had become “significantly undercapitalized” and was being taken over by the central bank. Just three months later, in January 2017, the Bank of Uganda announced that DFCU Bank had acquired certain assets and liabilities of Crane Bank. The acquisition was done quietly without public bidding, transparency, or parliamentary oversight. The sale, executed under the Financial Institutions Act, was concluded at an alleged gross undervaluation, raising eyebrows across the banking and legal fraternity.
What followed was a cascade of accusations, counter-accusations, and legal battles. The Bank of Uganda relied heavily on a forensic audit report conducted by PwC Uganda to justify the takeover. The report accused Crane Bank’s management of insider lending, governance failures, and financial irregularities. But Sudhir Ruparelia and Meera Investments, the majority shareholders dismissed the report as flawed, unverified and fundamentally biased. They claimed the BoU had orchestrated a rushed, irregular and politically motivated expropriation of their bank under the guise of regulatory enforcement.
The shareholders of Crane Bank filed multiple suits in the Ugandan courts, and 2019, the Supreme Court delivered a pivotal ruling. The court held that Crane Bank (in receivership) could not sue its former owners, effectively dismissing BoU’s Shs397 billion case against Sudhir. The ruling severely weakened the central bank’s position and raised serious questions about the legal procedures followed during the acquisition process. Having suffered a domestic legal setback, attention turned to international litigation.
In December 2020, Crane Bank Limited and its shareholders filed a suit against DFCU Bank in the High Court of Justice in London, alleging that the 2017 acquisition had been unlawful and constituted a conspiracy to expropriate their assets. The case, widely followed across East Africa, accused DFCU of colluding with BoU to take over Crane Bank through an illegitimate process. It also challenged the use of the PwC audit as a factual foundation for the acquisition.
Graduands at 31st Kampala International University graduation held at Ishaka-Bushenyi Municipality.
Ishaka–Bushenyi– Kampala International University (KIU) today marked a significant academic milestone during its 31st graduation ceremony, where a total of 2,214 students graduated across various disciplines. The event celebrated not only academic accomplishments but also the university’s enduring impact over the last 25 years.
Out of the 2,214 graduates, 914 were female and 1,300 were male, reflecting KIU’s ongoing commitment to gender-balanced and inclusive education.
Among the top achievers were over 60 students who attained First Class Honours. Ceaser Rwankote Charles emerged as the best student with a CGPA of 4.84 in International Relations and Diplomatic Studies. Other outstanding graduates included Kintu Collins (BBA, 4.81), Birabwa Joeria (BEd–Science Primary, 4.80), and Lasuba Joseph Chaplain (BSc Industrial Chemistry, 4.76), a South Sudanese national, reflecting KIU’s growing regional appeal.
The ceremony, held at the university’s Western Campus in Ishaka–Bushenyi, attracted dignitaries, parents, staff, and guests from Uganda and neighboring countries, including Kenya, South Sudan, and the Democratic Republic of Congo.
In his keynote address, the Chancellor of KIU, Prof. Yunus Daud Mgaya, delivered an inspiring speech celebrating the graduates and the legacy of the institution.
He noted, “It is with immense honor that I stand before you today as the Chancellor of Kampala International University to celebrate the achievements of the Class of 2025. I congratulate our graduates on this achievement.”
He reflected on the university’s journey, noting, “As we celebrate the 31st graduation ceremony, we reflect on where we’ve come from, a journey defined by hard work, resilience, and unwavering commitment to growth. It is an exciting chapter as KIU marks 25 years of dedication to quality education.”
He expressed deep appreciation to the university’s founder, saying, “I would like to express my deepest appreciation to the Chairman of the Board of Trustees, Al-Hajj Dr. Hassan Basajjabalaba, for his unwavering financial, moral, and material support to this university. He stands out as one of the most successful founders of a private university on the African continent.”
On the values guiding the institution, he stated that at KIU, the mission is to meet society’s needs by providing education rooted in the values of respect for society, the economy, and the environment.
He applauded, “I thank the council members, senate, and management of KIU for their strategic decisions, and I sincerely thank the Vice-Chancellor, Professor Ngoma Muhammad, for continuously engaging staff and building a strong team. His servant leadership will take KIU to greater heights.”
He affirmed the university’s forward-looking vision, noting that KIU continues to set the standard as a forward-thinking institution designed not just to impart knowledge, but to inspire action. The university’s vision remains clear — to be a premier institution of international repute, preparing students for the world of work and an inclusive society.
He added that the graduates are a generation of thinkers, creators, problem solvers, leaders, and dreamers who dare to imagine a better world. Noting, “The degree you receive today is not just a document. It is a call to responsibility. It is a challenge to use what you have learned not only to enrich your own lives but to serve your communities, your countries, and the world.”
In his remarks, KIU Vice Chancellor Prof. Muhammad Ngoma celebrated the transformation of the institution over the years.
He said, “KIU has evolved from humble beginnings into a high-value academic institution; now ranked as the top and best private university in East Africa.”
He noted that KIU continues to produce the highest percentage of STEM graduates among private universities in Uganda, aligning with the government’s development vision.
He noted, “It is worth noting that this year, we have a 75-year-old graduating with a Master’s in Public Health. Ms. Betty Irumba, wherever you are, you can wave to the audience. She decided to come back to study — and she is successfully graduating with us today.”
Prof. Ngoma further recognized the government’s support and applauded regulatory bodies, local and international academic partners, and the university’s Board of Trustees, especially Al-Hajj Dr. Basajjabalaba, for their consistent support and guidance.
“When the East African Medical and Dental Practitioners Council visited and inspected dental schools across the country, all were closed for lack of facilities and capacity — except KIU’s. That speaks volumes about our strength,” he said.
Al-Hajj Hassan Basajjabalaba, Chairman Board of Trustees, noted that when he says that KIU is ranked as the second-best private University in East Africa, it is important to remember that it has not been an easy road.
He noted, “It was difficult to convince people that we could start a private medical school here, but we did, and we were able to set up the first private medical school in Uganda.”
He added that maintaining a Top 5 rank in East Africa for five years is no accident. It is the result of vision, strategy, and hard work.
The 31st graduation not only honored the Class of 2025 but reaffirmed KIU’s role as a beacon of knowledge, innovation, and transformation across East Africa and beyond.
Some of the graduands who were awarded PhDs at Kampala International University.
Kampala International University (KIU) has today celebrated a landmark academic achievement as fifteen distinguished scholars were conferred Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) degrees in various fields, reaffirming the institution’s place among leading research-focused universities in the region.
The graduates, whose research tackled diverse and pressing developmental issues from environmental conservation to advanced engineering, hailed from Uganda and other parts of Africa, symbolizing KIU’s regional academic footprint.
Among the new PhD holders is Muhereza T. Franklin, who received a Doctor of Philosophy in Economics for his dissertation titled “Determinants of Economic Growth and Unemployment in East African Countries.” His research offers critical insights for economic policy and planning in the region.
Also conferred was Kibirige David, whose PhD in Renewable Energy focused on “Design and Implementation of a Photovoltaic System for Health Facilities in Rural Areas of Uganda.” According to him, “Access to reliable energy is not just a technology issue; it’s a life-saving necessity in rural health services.”
Ogwal Harold earned his PhD in Environmental Management for a study on “Effects of Wetland Spatial-Temporal Changes on Water Quality and Sediments: A Case of Okole Wetland in Lira City.” His research underscores the environmental threats facing Uganda’s wetlands amid rapid urban expansion.
In the realm of development studies, Opolot Simon Peter investigated “Land Tenure Systems and Agricultural Productivity in Ngora District.” He said his work aims to influence land reform policy to boost food security in eastern Uganda.
Other notable recipients include: Tumwijukye Ruth Komunda (PhD in Public Management) for her work on “Capacity Building Strategies and Performance of Local Government Personnel in Kanungu District.”
Muhwezi Amosi Kahara (PhD in Development Studies), who explored “Urbanization and Household Poverty in Uganda” using Nansana Municipality as a case study.
Ntirandekura Moses, whose public management thesis assessed “Good Governance and Women Economic Empowerment” in South Western Uganda through the Uganda Women Entrepreneurship Programme.
From Nigeria, Bakare Mutiu Shola (PhD in Electrical and Electronics Engineering) presented innovative work on smart energy systems, while Fasogbon Ilemobayo Victor (PhD in Biochemistry) researched computational methods for detecting Mycoplasma bovis, a livestock disease with economic impact.
In the civil engineering discipline, three scholars; Olaiya Bamidele Charles, Alaneme George Uwadiegwu, and Uche Chikadibia Kalu Awa — focused on sustainability and waste utilization in construction, developing alternatives using sawdust, banana leaf ash, bagasse, and plastic waste.
Sanusi Olatunji Idris (PhD in Pharmacy) evaluated contamination levels in Ugandan water sources, raising concerns about public health risks from heavy metals and pharmaceuticals in Kampala and Mbarara.
Meanwhile, Barah Obinna Onyebuchi (PhD in Mechanical Engineering) and Tijani Naheem Adekilekun (PhD in Microbiology) tackled advanced material science and medical microbiology, respectively, contributing to global research on automotive materials and antimicrobial resistance.
Speaking at the ceremony, the Vice Chancellor lauded the scholars for “contributing knowledge that does not only enrich academia but directly addresses some of Africa’s most pressing challenges.”
As Uganda and the broader region confront complex development problems, today’s KIU graduates walk away not only with academic titles but with tools and ideas that may shape the future.
SPOTLIGHT: Jimmy Mugerwa, Juma Kisaame, and Justine Bagyenda were the key individuals involved in the fraudulent sale of Crane Bank.
In the transnational legal dispute between Tycoon Sudhir Ruprelia’s Crane Bank Limited (CBL) and DFCU Bank, the High Court of Justice in London has rejected DFCU’s application to amend its defence in a way that would have allowed it to rely on disputed findings of PricewaterhouseCoopers (PWC) as proven facts in the ongoing corruption case. The decision was delivered on 24 July 2025 by Paul Stanley KC, sitting as a Deputy Judge of the High Court in the Commercial Court, King’s Bench Division.
Crane Bank Limited and several of its shareholders allege that the bank’s closure and subsequent asset transfer to DFCU in January 2017 were orchestrated through a corrupt scheme involving the Bank of Uganda.
According to the particulars of the claim, which run to 60 pages, CBL was “one of Uganda’s leading banks,” with a “strong balance sheet” and “highly profitable,” as attested by financial statements audited by KPMG. The claimants argue that the Bank of Uganda fabricated concerns about financial instability as a pretext to seize and sell the bank’s assets at a “gross undervaluation” through a “sham bidding process” in which DFCU was the primary beneficiary.
DFCU, which filed a defence almost 90 pages long, sought to bolster its case with key paragraphs summarising findings from two forensic reports produced by PWC, dated 21 December 2016 and 13 January 2017. These reports were commissioned by the Bank of Uganda about a week after CBL was placed under statutory management.
DFCU argued that the PWC reports identified serious mismanagement, including falsified balance sheets, hidden shareholder identities, improper diversion of funds, and insider deals. It contended that the existence and contents of the reports supported the central bank’s decision and countered the claimants’ narrative of a solvent bank unfairly shut down.
However, the court ruled that while DFCU could refer to the fact that the PWC reports were prepared and provided to the Bank of Uganda, it could not rely on the reports as establishing facts to be proved at trial.
“I refuse the permission in so far as the amendments do or may purport to incorporate, as factual allegations that DFCU will prove at trial, conclusions set out in two reports prepared by a third party,” stated Judge Stanley.
He clarified that although DFCU may rely on the existence of the reports to argue that a reasonable regulator might have considered them credible, it cannot plead their conclusions as primary facts to be accepted by the court.
The ruling added that DFCU has an arguable case that PWC prepared the reports on the dates claimed, but also acknowledged that there were discrepancies in dating and versions.
“I could not begin to decide those questions now, nor need I,” the judge noted.
He accepted that PWC’s reports, while voluminous and citing serious allegations of mismanagement, could not be fully admitted as evidence of truth without undermining fairness and proper trial preparation.
The judgment noted that while the reports may be relevant in several respects, such as contradicting the claim that the Bank of Uganda acted in bad faith or explaining the central bank’s regulatory actions, they do not need to be accepted as accurate for these points to be argued.
“Those arguments do not depend on PWC’s conclusions being correct. The arguments depend simply on the facts that PWC was instructed to prepare the reports, and that the reports that they prepared took the form that they did,” the judge stated.
The judge also addressed the legal standards for pleading and amendment. Pleadings, he said, must be unambiguous, concise, and coherent. They are intended to give notice of the facts to be proved at trial, not to serve as a vehicle for introducing unverified narrative or evidence. He warned that DFCU’s inclusion of “swathes” of PWC’s conclusions in its defence risked creating dangerous ambiguity, blurring the distinction between what was being reported and what was alleged as fact.
“I have considerable concern about those paragraphs,” said the judge, referring to the proposed subparagraphs of DFCU’s defence. “They seem to me to introduce a dangerous ambiguity.” In particular, some of the pleading language, such as references to what PWC found “in reality” or conclusions framed as undisputed facts, suggested that DFCU was attempting to adopt PWC’s conclusions wholesale as factual allegations. This was unacceptable because it would complicate the claimants’ ability to respond, burden the court with unnecessary details, and obstruct fair preparation for trial.
Stanley KC concluded that if DFCU intended to prove specific conclusions of the PWC reports as facts at trial, it must do so through proper, clearly framed pleadings—not by incorporation or summary. He refused to allow DFCU to introduce those specific paragraphs.
However, he permitted the body of paragraph 24.4, which asserts that a reasonable central bank regulator would have been entitled to regard the reports as credible and act accordingly. The judge advised that this portion should be relocated elsewhere in the defence due to chronological considerations, but otherwise found no fault in its framing.
The court also declined to rule on the admissibility of the PWC reports under Ugandan or English law, leaving that to the trial judge. One issue raised by the claimants was that PWC, as constituted in Uganda, may not have been licensed to perform accountancy services, potentially rendering their reports inadmissible. However, Judge Stanley said such matters would need to be decided later with full evidence.
However, DFCU’s reliance on specific claims from the PwC reports as primary facts has led to further objections, as these claims are improperly pleaded and substantiated.
The case is scheduled for a 12-week trial in the Michaelmas term of 2026. The court has already reviewed over 10,000 pages of material in preparation. With such high volumes of disclosure and expert testimony anticipated, Judge Stanley urged both sides to proceed with clarity and discipline to avoid derailing the proceedings.
“This is heavy litigation,” he remarked. Noting, “The particulars of the claim run to 60 pages. DFCU’s defence to nearly 90. The bundles… exceeded 10,000 pages.”
The ruling represents a strategic setback for DFCU Bank, which now faces stricter limits on how it can rely on third-party forensic audits to discredit the claimants’ version of events. For the shareholders of Crane Bank, it marks a procedural win and an important step in their pursuit of what they claim was a politically tainted and corrupt takeover of a thriving financial institution.
FULL RULING BELOW:
Neutral Citation Number: EWHC 1915 (Comm)
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
Case No: CL-2020-000859
BUSINESS AND PROPERTY COURTS OF ENGLAND AND WALES
KING’S BENCH DIVISION
COMMERCIAL COURT
Before :
Royal Courts of Justice, Rolls Building
Fetter Lane, London, EC4A INL
Date: 24/07/2025
Paul Stanley KC
(sitting as a Deputy Judge of the High Court)
Between:
Crane Bank Limited and Others Claimants
and –
DFCU Bank Limited and Others Defendants
Hannah Brown KC, David Caplan and Lauren Hitchman (instructed by Greenberg Taurig LLP) for the Claimants
Joe Smouha KC, Tom Ford and Jackie MacArthur (instructed by Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer LLP) for the First and Second Defendants
Hearing dates: 22-23 July 2025
Approved Judgment
This judgment was handed down by the judge during a hearing and by circulation to the parties’ representatives by email and release to The National Archives. The date and time for hand-down is deemed to be Thursday 24 July 2025 at 10:30am.
PAUL STANLEY KC SITTING AS A DEPUTY JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
PAUL STANLEY KC
Approved Judgment
Paul Stanley KC :
Crane Bank Ltd v DFCU Bank Ltd
Crane Bank Ltd (“CBL”) was a Ugandan bank. The claimants in this action are CBL and some of its significant shareholders. On 20 October 2016, the Bank of Uganda which regulated CBL-placed CBL under “statutory management”, and announced that it was doing so because CBL was “a significantly undercapitalised institution poses a systemic risk to the stability of the financial system, and… the continuation of [CBL]’s activities in its current form is detrimental to the interests of its depositors”. On 24 January 2017 it placed CBL into receivership, and the following day the Bank of Uganda, as receiver, agreed to transfer most of CBL’s assets and liabilities to the first defendant (“DFCU” for present purposes I do not need to distinguish between it and the second defendant, which is its parent company).
The claimants allege that this was the result of corruption. CBL was, they say (quoting from paragraph 8 of the particulars of claim) “one of Uganda’s leading banks”, with a “strong balance sheet”, attested by financial statements audited by KPMG, a “strong financial position”, and “highly profitable”. Their case is that Bank of Uganda manufactured pretend concerns about its financial stability, as part of a corrupt scheme to take over and sell CBL or its assets, which they allege began in 2016 and continued to early 2017, by which time DFCU (and the other defendants) were participants in it. The sale to DFCU was, they maintain, at a “gross undervalue”, and followed a “sham bidding process” orchestrated by the Bank of Uganda and its officials.
This is heavy litigation. The particulars of claim run to 60 pages. DFCU’s defence to nearly 90. On this CMC, the bundles of primary material before me have significantly exceeded 10,000 pages. It is listed for a 12 week trial to begin in Michaelmas term next year.
The issue before me is, however, narrow issue about pleading amendments. It really comes down to an objection to one long additional paragraph that DFCU wishes to add to its defence. The issue before me is whether permission should be given to make that amendment, which (as the parties ultimately agree) is a matter of discretion in application of the overriding objective to deal with the case “justly and at proportionate cost”.
I have decided that permission to make the amendments to which objection is made should partly be granted, and partly refused. I refuse the permission in so far as the amendments do or may purport to incorporate, as factual allegations that DFCU will prove at trial, conclusions set out in two reports prepared by a third party. I grant permission in so far as they seek to rely on the existence or terms of those reports, but without alleging that the reports are correct.
The PWC Reports
6. The argument is all about some reports produced by a company called Pricewaterhouse Coopers Ltd (“PWC”). Although Ms Brown KC, who appeared for the claimants, said that this company was not to be confused with the well-known international accountancy firm, there does not seem much room for doubt that PWC is indeed ostensibly part of that global “firm”, whether or not it is entitled to provide the services that it did under Ugandan law.
PAUL STANLEY KC
Approved Judgment
Crane Bank Ltd v DFCU Bank Ltd
7. DFCU’s case is that PWC was instructed by Bank of Uganda on 28 October 2016 about a week after CBL had been placed under supervision to prepare a report. At least two versions are available, and relied on: a preliminary report which was dated 21 December 2016, and a final report which was dated 13 January 2017. Although Ms Brown made submissions that various other versions of the reports call into question their dating, and that they (or parts of them) may have been written either earlier or later than those dates, I could not begin to decide those questions now, nor need I. I shall proceed on the basis that DFCU has an arguable case, as it plainly does, that PWC produced the reports on those dates.
8. The reports are largely but not completely identical (there are some potentially significant differences). They are long documents, running in each case to roughly 150 single-spaced pages. The versions before me, and apparently available to the parties, do not include appendices that they appear originally to have contained, and which are referred to in footnotes. Nor do they include any record of some of the primary material referred to, including information extracted from computers and records of various interviews on which PWC relied. They span a broad period, sometimes going back to events in the early 2000s. Their findings relate to numerous points of detail, and if accurate, can fairly be described as serious, indicating mismanagement of the bank in a number of respects, including the creation of a deliberately false impression on its balance sheet, disguising the identity of shareholders, improper diversion of bank money and sweetheart deals with insiders. If CBL was operated as the PWC reports suggested then it is on the face of it arguable that its management was not such as any sensible regulator would wish to see operating a strategically important bank.
9. The reports have, potentially at least, various types of relevance to this case. They go in at least three ways to the allegation that Bank of Uganda was simply pretending to have concerns about CBL in furtherance of a corrupt plan to strip its assets. As to that (a) it may be said to be inconsistent with such a plan that Bank of Uganda chose to instruct PWC to investigate at all, unless it were to be said (which it is not) that PWC was part of the conspiracy. (b) It may be said that the fact that PWC was reported (rightly or wrongly) a view that CBL was subject to serious mismanagement further undermines the proposition that similar allegations made by Bank of Uganda were made in bad faith- for how likely would it be that a non-conspirator would happen to agree with a story that had been conjured for corrupt purposes from nothing? And (c) it may be said that the Bank of Uganda relied, and (even if the Bank of Uganda was in fact acting nefariously) that a central bank regulator acting properly would have relied, on the PWC reports in taking action after 21 December 2016. The first two points are relevant to liability; the last to liability, causation and quantum.
10. Those arguments do not depend on PWC’s conclusions being correct. The defendants may “rely on the PWC reports” to make each of those points without seeking to persuade the trial judge that PWC’s conclusions are correct. The arguments depend simply on the facts that PWC were instructed to prepare the reports, and that the reports that they prepared took the form that they did. The reports’ apparent cogency, the expertise and qualifications of those preparing them, the extent to which they can be cross-checked to other material known to the Bank of Uganda may all be in issue. But it will not be necessary for the trial judge to decide whether the allegations the reports contain have been proved.
PAUL STANLEY KC
Approved Judgment
Crane Bank Ltd v DFCU Bank Ltd
11. The second set of arguments go to the propositions that CBL was (as it claims) a bank with a “strong balance sheet” and a “strong financial position”. It thereby also, indirectly, goes to the allegations that the sale to DFCU was at a “gross undervalue” and if it comes to that to any assessment of loss, either on the basis that CBL would have continued its business profitably, or on the basis that if sold it would have been sold for more than it was.
12. Those arguments, however, unlike the first set, may depend on whether PWC’s conclusions are correct. DFCU would “rely on the reports”, to the extent that it does, for their truth. If their conclusions are false then the inferences will not have such force. They might still have some force, even then, since when one is asking what central bank will permit, or what a potential purchaser will demand, even “issues” that, if bottomed out, might prove to be unimportant may affect value.
13. In broad terms, the basic issue that divides the parties is whether DFCU should be permitted, as a matter of pleading, to rely on the PWC reports “for their truth”. In other words, it is common ground that DFCU may legitimately make any point that flows from the fact that the reports were prepared and provided to the Bank of Uganda in the form they were. But the claimants object to the manner in which DFCU is proposing, or may be proposing, to plead the reports as a way of alleging that PWC’s conclusions are facts that the trial judge should find.
Legal principles: pleading and amendment
14. The purpose of a pleading is to give notice of the primary facts that a party intends to prove at trial. CPR 16.5 provides that a defence must identify which of the allegations in the particulars of claim are denied, and “their reasons for doing so”. Where a defendant intends to “put forward a different version of events from that given by the claimant, they must state their own version”. The Commercial Court Guide asks for statements of case to be “as concise as possible”, and that “evidence should not be included”: para C1.1.
15. Although it is simple enough in theory to gesture at the line between allegations of “primary fact”, “particulars” which are properly pleaded, and “evidence” which is not, drawing the line in any actual case is often a matter of pragmatic art. Moreover, there are some cases where the rules or practice directions require additional detail including (rarely) evidential matters (16 PD para 8.1) and, more commonly particulars of “any allegation of fraud” (16 PD para 8.2 (1)), “details of any misrepresentation” (16 PD para 8.2 (3)) and “notice or knowledge of any fact” (16 PD para 8.2 (5)).
16. To serve its purpose as a tool for the parties and the court to prepare for trial, a pleading needs to be unambiguous, and coherent: there should be no doubt what is being alleged, and the pleading should make sense. Lack of ambiguity, however, should not be turned into a demand for unreasonable precision, or excessive detail (which may, indeed, obscure the real issues); coherence does not prevent alternative pleas, provided the relationship between them is clear; and “making sense” does not mean that the pleading need state an overwhelmingly strong case. A pleading serves its purpose if it adequately defines a case worthy of consideration at trial.
17. When it comes to amendments, the overriding consideration is the overriding objective: where possible the court wishes to be put in a position to determine the real issues at trial, which in turn means that those issues should be squarely, fairly, and comprehensibly set out in the pleadings. As has rightly been said, “the circumstances in which amendments may be put forward are infinitely variable and … each contested application will require an exercise of the court’s discretion that takes into account the particular facts of the case at hand”: Vilca v Xstrata Ltd EWHC 2096 (Comm) .
PAUL STANLEY KC
Approved Judgment
Crane Bank Ltd v DFCU Bank Ltd
18. Nevertheless, although circumstances vary, certain patterns repeat, so that in broad terms various common objections emerge in the cases. One possible taxonomy might suggest that there are three broad categories of objection:
i) Objections to the proposed pleading as a pleading. This category includes objections that the proposed amendment will not properly serve a pleading’s intended function, for example because the other parties and the court cannot understand it or work out what fact is being alleged, or because it impermissibly pleads evidence or narrative background rather than primary fact, or because it does not give sufficient detail for the other party to respond to it or prepare its case, or because it will be difficult or impossible for the party responding to it to “plead back”, or because it raises irrelevant points which will simply obscure relevant issues. These are all objections which could, if no amendment were required, be made under CPR 3.4 (b) which permits the court to strike out a statement of case which “is an abuse of the court’s process or is otherwise likely to obstruct the just disposal of proceedings”.
ii) Objections to the proposed pleading on the merits. The classic cases is one in which the amendments allege facts that, if proved, would not establish a claim, or not establish a defence, and which (if made in a statement of case) would be liable to be struck out under CPR 3.4 (a), which empowers the court to strike out a statement of case which “discloses no reasonable grounds for bringing or defending the claim”. But the point may go further than that, for the court may refuse to permit amendments even if the fact (if proved) would be important, but where the evidential basis for the allegation is so thin that the person seeking to make the amendment has no realistic prospect of getting that ball into the net: Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha Ltd v James Kemball Ltd 3 All ER 978 at .
iii) Objections on case management grounds. Some amendments cause only modest expense, and do not pose any risk of disrupting an established timetable (for example, an amendment to plead a new legal theory based on already-pleaded facts made long before trial). Others are much more disruptive and costly, involving for instance the need to re-visit disclosure searches that have been completed, or obtain new evidence, or in an extreme case resulting in the adjournment of a trial. The more disruptive the amendment, the less likely it is to be allowed: see CIP Properties (AIPT) Ltd v Galliford Try Infrastructure Ltd EWHC 1345 (TCC) at . It is in this context that “late amendments” are sometimes dealt with as if they occupied a special category, though I would be inclined to think that this simply reflects points on a spectrum, rather than any sort of watershed.
19. The cases indicate that, in accordance with the overriding objective, the court must balance the prejudice to each party-to the amending party if the amendment is refused, and to the responding party if it is allowed. Although I am sure that balancing is always required, I do not think that every issue on an amendment application can be turned into a balancing act.
PAUL STANLEY KC
Approved Judgment
Crane Bank Ltd v DFCU Bank Ltd
For instance, where the court disallows after argumentan amendment which discloses no reasonable claim it is not balancing anything, and since the claim is not one that could succeed there is no prejudice to the amending party to balance. The cost and disruption considerations, however, will always involve some element of balance.
The position here
20. The claimants realistically do not generally object to those amendments that plead the PWC reports as facts: that PWC was instructed, that they reported as they did, and the consequences that that fact would have for the actions or reactions of the Bank of Uganda, an honest and reasonable central bank regulator in the position of the Bank of Uganda, or third party prospective purchasers of CBL’s business.
21. The claimants’ first specific objection is to paragraph 24.2 of the defence. Paragraph 24 as a whole is responding to an allegation that the Bank of Uganda placed CBL under statutory management on 20 October 2016, and that this was done “in bad faith and to advance the Corrupt Scheme”. Paragraph 24 of the defence admits that the Bank of Uganda placed CBL under statutory management on that date, but does not admit that it was done in bad faith or to advance the alleged “Corrupt Scheme”, and maintains that there was a proper basis on which the Bank of Uganda could determine that CBL should be put under statutory management. Paragraph 24.2 is part of setting out those reasons.
22. The claimants’ first objection in that paragraph is to the inclusion of reference to the PWC reports in this context (the words objected to are in italics):
“As appears from BoU’s letter to CBL dated 1 July 2016, from the executed Memorandum of Understanding between the BoU and CBL dated 16 August 2016 and from paragraphs 3.18 to 3.31 of the PwC Forensic Review and from paragraphs 3.17 to 3.30 of the PwC January Report, serious issues in relation to the financial position, management and risks surrounding CBL had been identified by the BoU… in 2015 and during Spring to Summer 2016 and/or during previous on-site examinations….”
23. The claimants say that although the first two documents referred to may arguably be material which shows the Bank of Uganda’s state of mind on 20 October 2016, the PWC reports cannot, because they were not available then. Moreover, the incorporation by reference of those paragraphs of the PWC reports (they are in substance identical) is, they say, objectionable. How should they respond to the range of allegations in those paragraphs by no means all of which, or most of which, purport to set out anything known to the Bank of Uganda on 20 October 2016?
24. Mr Ford, who argued the application of DFCU with great economy and realism, defended the italicised words as a fair and helpful explanation of why DFCU thought the allegation maintainable. I do not accept that this is necessary or desirable in a pleading, unless pleading particulars of knowledge. The reasons why a party makes an allegation are, at best, evidence-and sometimes not even that. They do not need to be given, and generally should not be. The first two items listed, to which the claimants do not object, probably fall into a different category since they are, at least implicitly, providing “particulars of knowledge” (i.e. the reasons why DFCU says that the Bank of Uganda believed CBL was financially precarious); at any rate, they have not been objected to. I agree with the claimants that the inclusion of any reference to the PWC reports here simply obscures the real issues.
PAUL STANLEY KC
Approved Judgment
Crane Bank Ltd v DFCU Bank Ltd
25. I shall not therefore give permission to make that amendment.
26. The other amendment to which the claimants object is in paragraph 24.2.1, in which DFCU pleads:
“As at 31 March 2016, CBL had a high level of non-performing loans (‘NPLs’) amount to UGX 243.6bn or 21.44% of the total credit portfolio, and accounting for a significant proportion of the total NPLs in the Ugandan banking sector as a whole.”
27. In this case, I see no legitimate objection to the amendment as drafted. True, DFCU seems to have derived its allegation from the PWC reports but (precisely because it is not necessary to explain where an allegation comes from) that does not matter. The allegation, for whatever it is worth, is simply a factual allegation that DFCU can make.
28. I shall therefore grant permission for this amendment.
29. We then enter the most contested area, which is paragraph 24.4.
30. That paragraph begins by pleading (a) that it is at present not suggested that PWC was part of the conspiracy and (b) that those taking decisions at a central bank would have been “reasonably entitled to regard the matters as identified in the PwC Forensic Review and/or the PwC January Report to be credible” and (c) that they would have “supported a good faith belief that provisions and write offs were appropriate, wrongdoing had been prevalent at CBL and that CBL, as hitherto managed, represented a “systemic risk” so that the replacement of its existing management was detrimental to the interests of depositors.
31. I see nothing in that part of the pleading which could fairly be regarded as anything further than an allegation that a regulator in the position of Bank of Uganda would have been entitled to act on the assumption that the PWC reports were credible and supported the regulatory action referred to. I do not think that is ambiguous or unclear. And, so understood, I see no legitimate objection to it. The only room for possible complaint is that paragraph 24.4 does not belong where it has been placed in the defence, because it must be alleging conclusions that would have been drawn by the Bank of Uganda, or a central bank in its position, after the PWC reports were to hand, not in October. Mr Ford told me that there was no magic to the positioning of the allegation: this had been though as good a place as any. It would, I think, be better if the plea were moved to elsewhere and become a free-standing plea rather than looking like a response to paragraph 21 of the Particulars of Claim, which it logically and practically is not. But with that minor point, I see nothing problematic about it.
32. Paragraph 24.4, however, thereafter continues, with the introductory words “The matters identified by the PwC Forensic Review and the PwC January report included:”, to introduce seven paragraphs which summarise and sometimes refer to many pages of the conclusions of those reviews.
33. I have considerable concern about those paragraphs, which seem to me to introduce a dangerous ambiguity. On the one hand, they are introduced as providing further details not of matters that are alleged to be true, but of issues that are alleged to be credible, and one reading of “matters identified” would be in that spirit.
PAUL STANLEY KC
Approved Judgment
Crane Bank Ltd v DFCU Bank Ltd
That is supported by aspects of the detail that is given. For example, it is not said that there was misrepresentation, but simply that there “was evidence of misrepresentation”, and it is not said that IT staff had been instructed to withhold information or delete emails, but that PWC “understood that had happened. On the other hand, some of the terms in which they are pleaded suggests that they are being put forward as allegations not simply that PWC reached conclusions, but that those conclusions were correct, and one reading of “matters identified” would be not merely that PWC reached a conclusion, but that it had discovered a truth. So, for instance, paragraph 24.4.2 frequently uses the expression “in reality” (though it also says that it describes what “PWC concluded”), and paragraph 24.4.3 appears to consist simply of allegations of fact. Moreover, later cross-references in DFCU’s defence to paragraph 24 is in terms (by reference to “facts”) or in contexts (where one would have thought that it is the true position, not simply PWC’s conclusions about it) that suggests that what might be intended is an allegation that PWC had not simply reached conclusions, but that the facts were as PWC had concluded.
34. That sort of ambiguity seems to me to be inconsistent with the objective of a pleading to give clear notice of the case that the recipient must meet. That DFCU has not itself, in correspondence, its written submissions to me, and Mr Ford’s oral submissions been completely consistent in the interpretation that it offers reinforces my concern in that respect.
35. Moreover, if the sub-paragraphs to paragraph 24 are intended to allege as facts the matters that DFCU will seek to prove at trial, I do not think they do so in a way that is consistent with the overriding objective. They effectively incorporate, sometimes explicitly by referring to paragraphs, sometimes indirectly by referring to matters such as “a number of elaborate fraudulent schemes”, many paragraphs and pages of the PWC reports, covering many years. Occasionally, the detail in those paragraphs, when examined, differs between the reports in material ways (in particular, as to the financial effect on CBL’s accounts of one particular alleged fraudulent scheme). Although a cross-reference to a long document meets one requirement of pleading, by being concise, it is ultimately unacceptable because it poses the immediate question: how would the claimants respond to this? Are they supposed to work through each PWC report, which in no way resembles a proper pleading, to set out their point-by-point rebuttal or admission of what PWC alleges? If the intention were to use these paragraphs as a way of incorporating, by reference, PWC’s conclusions as allegations in this case, this is not the right way of doing so: it would obstruct the orderly resolution of the case.
36. In addition, I considered that there is force in Ms Brown’s submission that if the effect of these paragraphs was to introduce what she aptly described as “swathes” of the PWC Reports into contention as primary facts, they would be likely to have a seriously disruptive effect on preparation for trial. For my part I find it hard to imagine how the parties could prepare for, or the court manage, a trial which might at any point have to turn to the detail of what are at least tens of interlinked factual contentions, often raising serious allegations, over several years. Many of them relate to events which occurred before the earliest date for which disclosure searches have been carried out (which is 2015). Some of the alleged frauds identified by PWC are indeed “elaborate”, and cross-linked. Their pursuit as claims would itself require precise and detailed pleading, and be likely to produce a long and complex trial in its own right. The PWC reports, whatever their merits (which are hotly disputed) do not resemble a pleading.
PAUL STANLEY KC
Approved Judgment
Crane Bank Ltd v DFCU Bank Ltd
37. If, on the other hand, these paragraphs are intended simply as summaries of what DFCU says are the “headline points” that a central bank regulator would have drawn from the PWC reports, they seem to be unnecessary. Such a summary might be valuable if DFCU’s case was that there were only one or two specific conclusions in the PWC reports that would matter to a central bank regulator. But they don’t do that, and they are introduced by the words often a red flag in any pleading that the reports “included” these matters, so they do not even purport to be comprehensive. They then essentially cover the entire ground, and simply clutter the pleading with unnecessary detail in which the only real argument could be the entirely sterile one of whether the learned pleader has adequately summarised a document that is before the court in full.
38. For those reasons, I will not give permission for the words “The matters identified…” or the sub-paragraphs to paragraph 24.4. I will, however, give permission for the body of paragraph 24.4 itself (though, subject to any submissions I may hear, perhaps not in that place, which is chronologically inapt) on the strict understanding that they allege, as I hold they do, merely that a central bank regulator would have been entitled to place reliance on the PWC reports and would have drawn certain conclusions from them, and not that DFCU is adopting those conclusions as factual allegations.
39. I have not, in reaching this conclusion, ignored Mr Ford’s point that on the face of the pleadings as they stand, there is an issue about what CBL’s actual financial position was. That has been the subject of disclosure and will be the subject of expert evidence, and in particular a clear plea in paragraph 17 of the defence that its 2015 audited accounts “did not reflect the full position and/or materially misstated both the financial and regulatory compliance position of CBL”. I also accept that the reply formally denies the accuracy of PWC’s conclusions. But in circumstances where none of them had been specifically adopted by DFCU (and the claimants expressly reserved their position if they were) I do not think that takes matters further. How far, on the basis of this existing plea, DFCU and its experts will be entitled to rely on any of the underlying material on which the PWC reports are based, or indeed on the reports themselves, may well prove controversial. But that issue is not before me: there is no application to strike out any part of the existing pleadings; no application for further information; and no application to limit disclosure or expert evidence. I do not have to decide that, and do not do so. I am, however, quite clear that to the extent that DFCU wishes to plead, as factual allegations that it positively intends to prove, any of PWC’s specific conclusions, paragraph 24.4 attempts to do so in a way that is inconsistent with effective preparation for a fair trial. Whether DFCU needs to do so to make the case it wishes to make is a matter I cannot and do not decide.
40. Nor am I willing to accede to Ms Brown’s invitation to rule now that the PWC reports would be, as a matter of law, inadmissible to prove any primary fact. That submission was advanced on two bases. First, she said, under Ugandan law, PWC was not authorised to provide accountancy services, so the evidence must be excluded. There is a dispute about whether the provision of the report would constitute the practice of accountancy under Ugandan law, which I could not decide. There is, in any event, a further question about whether, if they did, that would render the report inadmissible as a matter of English law, it would not necessarily do so. Those are both, and clearly, matters for the trial judge. Secondly, Ms Brown said that expert evidence along the lines of the accountancy report would be inadmissible because all or much of the reports consist of factual (or sometimes legal) conclusions based on an assessment of evidence. Again, I do not think this is a question that can be decided in the abstract.
PAUL STANLEY KC
Approved Judgment
Crane Bank Ltd v DFCU Bank Ltd
It seems to me, on the face of it, eminently possible that there might be aspects of the PWC reports which would be admissible hearsay (for instance to prove what PWC had been told, or to provide secondary evidence about the contents of documents they had examined), and also quite likely that there would be other aspects where they might well be inadmissible or of negligible weight. All those things, if they arise, together with the other criticisms that Ms Brown made of the reports, are properly matters for trial.
41. The controversial amendments that remain all consist of cases where, in the context of its defence as to causation and quantum, DFCU inserts cross-references indicating that it intends to rely on paragraph 24. These are a mixed bag, in the sense that in some of them it seems likely that DFCU would be intending by that cross-reference to allege that a central bank regulator would have been likely to place reliance on PWC’s conclusions (right or wrong). That is especially true of the paragraphs that relate to the action that a hypothetical regulator would have taken. I have in mind paragraphs 115.3.3, 115.4.2, and 116.1. One other seems to be intended to refer to (or include) CBL’s actual financial position, and might be based on the proposition that CBL had committed the various wrongs that PWC considered were shown. I have in mind paragraph 114.2. However, it seems to me that so long as it is clear that paragraph 24.4 contains only an allegation that the PWC report was one on which a regulator was entitled to rely, there is no practical difficulty. The claimants may say that the cross-reference in paragraph 114.2 does not in fact advance DFCU’s defence. But that is a matter for trial, and since it will (with or without any explicit cross-reference) be open to DFCU to rely in argument on any primary fact that it has properly pleaded and established in any event, I see no reason to micro-manage these references.
42. I am concerned that, lurking only barely below the surface of this application, there is an incipient case management issue. On the one hand, Mr Ford is clearly correct that the financial condition of CBL and the accuracy of its audited accounts is a relevant issue in the case, and issue joined on the pleadings about that. How far, however, it will be open to DFCU to advance, at trial, specific allegations about particular aspects of CBL’s management and financial position, and how that will be done, offers fertile ground for ongoing debate. It may be that DFCU or its experts will either want or need to focus on some matters which are covered by the PWC reports, and that DCFU will seek to prove them as primary facts. As things stand, it is probable that if and when it does so, it will be met by the objection that it has not given adequate notice of that, and equally likely that it will respond as Mr Ford did by contending that it has already done enough. But, whatever the rights and wrongs of such arguments (which cannot sensibly be addressed in a vacuum and are not before me now), I do not think that they can be fairly resolved by the indiscriminate incorporation of the substance of both reports in the form that was before me, and it will be for the experienced solicitors and counsel on both sides to decide how next to proceed. I therefore grant permission only to the extent that I have indicated, and otherwise refuse it.
Prof. Badru Kateregga and his wife, Mrs. Jolly Shubaiha Kateregga are in a bitter fight over property and DNA results that indicated that one of the children didn't match the father's results.
The Uganda Police Force has distanced itself from a family dispute involving renowned academic Prof. Badru Kateregga and his wife, Mrs. Jolly Shubaiha Kateregga, stating categorically that it has no legal authority to evict her from their matrimonial home.
The clarification was issued in a strongly worded statement released by the Police Headquarters following widespread media reports and social media commentary accusing police of inaction in the matter.
“The Uganda Police Force has seen a statement circulating in social media and other media outlets concerning a dispute between Prof. Badru Kateregga and his wife, Mrs. Jolly Shubaiha Kateregga in which they drag the police in their family dispute,” reads the statement dated July 25, 2025.
Police added, “In view of the public interest and the allegations made by Prof. Badru Kateregga, we wish to provide the following clarification.”
Police confirmed that the domestic conflict was formally brought to their attention on November 7, 2024, and that a full investigation was conducted under reference CID HQRS/GEF 306/204.
“The matter was fully investigated and the case file was submitted to the office of the Directorate of Public Prosecutions (ODPP) for review and legal guidance,” police said.
Following this review, the ODPP advised on February 18, 2025 that the dispute is a civil matter, primarily concerning property ownership and management and should be resolved through the courts of law, not police intervention.
“The above position has since been communicated to both conflicting parties through their lawyers,” police noted.
Police added, “The expectation by Prof. Kateregga that police or CID in particular, has powers to remove Mrs. Jolly Shubaiha Kateregga from the premises is outside our mandate.”
Police emphasized that only a competent court of law has the authority to alter the possession or occupancy of disputed property.
“The alteration of possession of property under dispute can only be effected by a court order. Any request to act outside of this legal framework, or in the absence of a court order, cannot be entertained,” the statement added.
In reinforcing its legal limits, the Force cautioned against any misconceptions about its role in civil disputes.
Police noted, “Any notion that the police can override the opinion of the ODPP or carry out actions contrary to established legal procedures is unfounded.”
The Uganda Police Force reiterated its commitment to upholding the rule of law and encouraged both Prof. Kateregga and Mrs. Kateregga to pursue lawful avenues to resolve their differences.
“As custodians of the law, the Uganda Police can only act within the boundaries of the law. We work in close collaboration with other institutions, such as the ODPP, whose advice and directives we adhere to without deviation,” the statement concluded.
This development brings clarity to a dispute that has attracted significant public interest, especially given Prof. Kateregga’s high-profile academic and business career.
Kampala International University (KIU) has once again solidified its position as Uganda’s leading private institution, maintaining its status as the number one private university in the country and across the East African region.
This recognition comes from the July 2025 edition of the Webometrics World Ranking of Universities, a globally respected evaluation that measures academic web presence, research impact, and openness.
In the national rankings, KIU also held firm as Uganda’s second-best university overall, trailing only Makerere University, the country’s oldest public institution. Notably, Makerere has recently faced criticism following a dip in its global rankings.
“We are immensely proud of this consistent recognition from Webometrics,” said Prof. Mohammed Ngoma, the Vice-Chancellor of KIU.
“Maintaining our leadership is a testament to the dedication of our faculty, staff, and students. It reflects our strategic investments in digital infrastructure, cutting-edge research, and a vibrant online presence that makes our academic output accessible globally.”
Prof. Muhammad Ngoma, Vice Chancellor, Kampala International University.
Other top-ranking institutions in the country include Mbarara University of Science and Technology (MUST), which claimed third place nationally, followed by Gulu University, Kyambogo University, and Kabale University.
With over 50 universities now operating in Uganda, both public and private, the competition for academic excellence and global recognition is more intense than ever. As digital innovation and research become central to university competitiveness, KIU’s consistent top performance highlights its forward-thinking approach and commitment to quality education.
This latest Webometrics recognition further validates KIU’s continued investment in technology, digital learning platforms, and research output—critical pillars for universities seeking visibility and credibility on the international stage.
Soldiers overseeing the operation in Northern Uganda.
The Uganda Peoples’ Defence Forces (UPDF) has dismissed recent allegations circulating on social media and in some local reports, which suggest that security personnel involved in Operation Harmony have engaged in misconduct and that some officers have been arrested.
In a statement issued by UPDF Spokesperson, Major General Felix Kulaigye the army clarified that the operation spearheaded by the 5 Infantry Division is proceeding lawfully, peacefully and in strict compliance with presidential directives and existing legal frameworks regarding the Balaalo settlements in Northern Uganda.
“Operation Harmony, led by the 5th Infantry Division of the Uganda Peoples’ Defence Forces (UPDF), continues to make steady progress,” said Maj. Gen. Kulaigye.
He added, “The operation is being conducted in coordination with local authorities and other security agencies, in line with Presidential directives concerning the lawful presence of the Balaalo in the region.”
Dismissing the allegations as deliberate misinformation, Kulaigye made it clear that no UPDF officer participating in the operation has been arrested, nor has there been any breach of professional conduct.
“Recent claims circulating in the public domain alleging misconduct by security personnel are false. No officer participating in Operation Harmony has been arrested. All deployed personnel remain fully committed to their duties and are executing their responsibilities with professionalism and impartiality,” he stated.
The UPDF further condemned what it termed as propaganda aimed at inciting ethnic tensions, undermining the credibility of the security forces, and misleading the public.
“Unfortunately, a few individuals and groups appear to be deliberately spreading misinformation intended to incite ethnic tension, intimidate security personnel, and mislead the public. This form of propaganda undermines public trust and risks stirring unnecessary conflict,” he noted.
According to the statement, all evictions related to the Balaalo issue are being carried out peacefully, under consultation with local leaders, and within the legal framework. The army reiterated its commitment to professionalism and the rule of law.
He said, “All evictions are being conducted peacefully, in consultation with local leaders, and strictly within the boundaries of the law. The security forces remain focused on maintaining public order and preventing violence or unlawful activity.”
Citizens were urged to report any legitimate grievances through the proper channels, including local leaders and authorised security officers.
Kulaigye encouraged members of the public to report any concerns through recognized and lawful channels, including local leadership structures and authorized security representatives. Noting, “Senior UPDF officers are stationed at designated collection centres and are working closely with District Security Committees to address legitimate grievances.”
Maj. Gen. Kulaigye emphasized that the UPDF will not be derailed by falsehoods or intimidation and reaffirmed the army’s dedication to implementing government policy with transparency, respect for human rights, and discipline.
“Operation Harmony will not be distracted by misinformation. The UPDF remains committed to executing government policy with discipline, transparency, and unwavering respect for peace and the rule of law.”
Operation Harmony, which targets illegal grazing and land occupation issues linked to the Balaalo herders in Northern Uganda, has been under close public scrutiny, with both praise and concern raised by stakeholders. The UPDF’s latest statement appears aimed at reassuring the public and affirming that the army is acting in the national interest and within legal limits.
The Supreme Court of Zimbabwe has ruled in favour of Ugandan nationals Robert Kweyunga Kwesiga and Sande Hilda Kwesiga, effectively reversing an earlier High Court decision that had frozen their properties under an unexplained wealth order.
The July 11th, 2025 ruling, delivered by a panel of three Supreme Court Justices, Uchena JA, Kudya JA, and Chatukuta JA allowed the couple’s appeal with costs. It set aside the interlocutory judgment handed down by the High Court on May 15, 2024. That decision had declared the couple’s assets suspicious and ordered them to appear before Zimbabwean police to explain the source of their funds.
The court observed that the claims by the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) were unfounded, speculative, and unsupported by any credible evidence.
“The court found that the assertions of the Prosecutor General and subsequent findings by the High Court had no objective factual foundation. There were NO objective facts to support it,” the Supreme Court judgment read.
The NPA had obtained the unexplained wealth order in May 2024, alleging that the couple’s known income was insufficient to support the purchase of two Harare properties and suggesting that the properties were acquired from the proceeds of crime.
However, the Kwesigas were represented by Advocate Thabani Mpofu and instructed by the law firm Gill, Godlonton & Gerrans, who maintained that they legally purchased the properties during their time in Zimbabwe between 2005 and 2013, when Robert Kwesiga served as Regional Head for the International Red Cross and Sandie Hilda Kwesiga worked as a diplomat.
They submitted detailed evidence to the court, including Ugandan property sale agreements, bank statements, pay slips, and affidavits. They also included testimony from their estate agent and legal practitioner confirming that payments were made through formal banking channels. Despite this, the High Court dismissed their explanation on technical grounds, including the claim that some Ugandan documents were unauthenticated.
The origins of the legal dispute date back to December 2020, when a tenant named Derrick Manuel Dube falsely claimed US$108,284 in damages, alleging he had carried out major repairs and suffered losses while renting one of the properties. He secured a default judgment without the Kwesigas’ knowledge and began attachment proceedings to sell the property. The couple’s letting agent, Knight Frank, only discovered the case after the property was advertised for sale. The judgment was later set aside, and an appeal against that reversal was dismissed.
At this point, the Prosecutor General filed an ex parte application, accusing the Kwesigas of acquiring the properties through proceeds of crime. This was even though the couple had already submitted a sworn and detailed explanation of how they acquired the properties and what resources they had at the time.
Nevertheless, in a ruling dated May 15, 2024, Justice Chikowero of the High Court concluded there was reasonable suspicion that a crime had been committed and ordered the couple to appear before the Zimbabwe Republic Police within 30 days.
Shockingly, just two days later, on May 17, 2024, the Office of the Prosecutor General issued a public statement celebrating the judgment as a major step in its fight against crime and corruption. The statement claimed that it had submitted reasonable grounds to suspect the couple of serious criminal conduct and asserted that their known income could not have supported the property purchases. This statement was widely circulated in the media, despite there being no supporting evidence, and has now been branded as patently defamatory.
In response, the Kwesigas appealed to the Supreme Court and emphasized that all court documents are public and open to scrutiny. They stated that no court had ever been presented with evidence of wrongdoing—only evidence showing lawful income and transactions had been submitted.
The Supreme Court, in its final ruling, firmly criticized the approach of the Prosecutor General’s office, calling its application “half-baked” and based on “inchoate or unparticularized suspicion.” Justice Kudya, delivering the lead opinion, noted that the NPA had not even attempted to determine the couple’s income at the time the properties were acquired. The court said the claims were “plucked from thin air” and based entirely on conjecture.
Following the Supreme Court victory, Robert Kwesiga, a senior humanitarian official with the Danish Red Cross, released a personal statement on social media reaffirming his commitment to transparency and humanitarian service.
“Justice is served! I am pleased to share that the legal matter concerning my property in Zimbabwe has been resolved in my favor, following a thorough judicial review and appeal process,” he wrote.
He added, “The court’s decision confirms that the allegations leading to the asset freeze were unfounded. I have always maintained transparency and integrity in my work, both personally and professionally.”
He added, “While the situation attracted significant public attention, I chose to respect the legal process and allow the facts to speak for themselves. I remain fully committed to the humanitarian mission of the Red Cross and to serving communities across Uganda and beyond.”
Kwesiga emphasized that the matter was strictly personal. “This matter was entirely personal and unrelated to my role at the Uganda Red Cross Society, which remains focused on its humanitarian mission,” he clarified.
The Supreme Court’s ruling not only restores the couple’s reputation but also calls into question the conduct of the Prosecutor General’s office, which had publicly accused the Kwesigas without basis. Legal experts are now watching closely to see whether the couple will pursue action for defamation or damages arising from the now-discredited accusations.
The Former Crane Bank Ntinda branch, which DFCU took over and illegally rebranded in its name, was ordered by the court to vacate and compensate Meera Investments because the property belongs to Meera.
“Justice requires that both parties have equal access to the evidence. Denying the claimants access to their records while seeking to use those records against them is not just unfair, it is unacceptable,” the court noted.
In a sharp legal rebuke, the High Court in London has dismissed an application by DFCU Bank to amend its defence in the long-running Crane Bank case, marking a fresh and significant victory for businessman Sudhir Ruparelia and the former shareholders of Crane Bank Limited (CBL).
The ruling deepens DFCU’s legal troubles in the UK, following earlier defeats in Uganda’s courts, and shines a harsh spotlight on the circumstances surrounding the controversial sale of Crane Bank in 2017.
“This Court is not satisfied that the evidence DFCU seeks to introduce is either reliable or legally admissible,” reads part of the London court’s judgment, which struck out DFCU’s bid to rely on a forensic audit report that was purportedly authored by PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC).
The disputed report allegedly linking CBL and its shareholders to fraud, mismanagement, and corruption was at the heart of DFCU’s latest legal strategy. The bank had hoped that the UK court would allow it to amend its defence by introducing the report, which it claimed justified the Bank of Uganda’s (BoU) 2016 seizure and subsequent sale of Crane Bank to DFCU.
However, the court sided with the claimants, Crane Bank and its shareholders, who mounted six forceful objections to the report’s authenticity and legality.
“The report was not prepared by the global PwC network but by an unlicensed local entity using the same name. It lacks credibility, was inconsistently documented, and is inadmissible under Ugandan law,” the claimants’ legal team argued.
In its ruling, the court found that the report existed in multiple contradictory versions, some unsigned or backdated, others missing appendices and supporting data. Most critically, the court was persuaded that Crane Bank had been denied access to its own records, held by BoU and DFCU, making it impossible for the shareholders to challenge the report’s claims meaningfully.
As a result, DFCU’s application to amend its defence was thrown out, and the bank was ordered to pay legal costs to the claimants.
The Crane Bank saga dates back to October 2016, when the Bank of Uganda took over the institution, citing undercapitalisation. At the time, Crane Bank was one of Uganda’s largest indigenous banks. The central bank later sold its assets to DFCU Bank in a closed-door deal valued at Shs200 billion, far below the bank’s book value.
Sudhir and other shareholders have long maintained that the sale was fraudulent, unconstitutional, and executed without due process. In 2019, Uganda’s High Court sided with the shareholders, ruling that Crane Bank (under receivership) had no legal standing to sue its former owners. The decision was upheld by both the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court, which also criticised BoU’s conduct.
Facing legal dead ends in Uganda, DFCU turned to the High Court in London. In addition to the dismissed application to amend its defence, the bank had also filed a second application seeking broad disclosure orders.
In that request, DFCU asked the court to compel access to personal devices, emails, and messages of nearly every person on the claimants’ side, including phones, laptops, and private email accounts. But here too, the court struck a careful balance.
“The court rejected the majority of DFCU’s invasive disclosure requests,” confirmed sources familiar with the ruling.
“Only a few devices and specific periods were approved for search, namely, Sheena’s personal email and messaging apps used by Dr. Ruparelia, Meera, and Sheena from 2015 to 2019.”
Additionally, the court formally recognized Ruparelia as the legal representative of the estate of his late son Rajiv Ruparelia, who was previously part of the case.
The court further declined to fix hearing dates for October until all necessary filings are completed, effectively slowing DFCU’s attempt to expedite proceedings.
This latest legal blow adds to mounting scrutiny over DFCU’s acquisition of Crane Bank. Key questions continue to emerge!
Why was the sale of a multibillion-shilling institution conducted in secrecy and without public bidding?
Why did DFCU accept the PWC report without independent due diligence?
Has DFCU’s legal strategy abroad become a liability for its shareholders?
Legal analysts say DFCU’s efforts in London increasingly appear to be a strategic miscalculation.
“What started as a tactical shift to UK courts is now unravelling,” said a Kampala-based corporate lawyer familiar with the case. “They’ve lost in Uganda, and now they’re losing in the UK. This could have serious reputational and financial consequences for DFCU.”
With another major application dismissed, DFCU’s legal campaign in London is faltering. The attempt to revive its case using a discredited audit report has not only failed but also deepened the credibility crisis surrounding its acquisition of Crane Bank.
Meanwhile, Sudhir Ruparelia’s legal team remains undefeated, cementing his position as a formidable force in one of Uganda’s most consequential financial and legal battles.
